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BEYOND STRICT SCRUTINY:
FORBIDDEN PURPOSE AND
THE ‘ ‘C IV IL COMMITMENT ’ ’ POWER
Eric S. Janus*
Sex offender civil commitment (SOCC) is a massive deprivation of liberty as
severe as penal incarceration. Because it eschews most of the ‘‘great safeguards’’
constraining the criminal power, SOCC demands careful constitutional scru-
tiny. Although the Supreme Court has clearly applied heightened scrutiny in
judging civil commitment schemes, it has never actually specified where on the
scrutiny spectrum its analysis falls. This article argues that standard three-tier
scrutiny analysis is not the most coherent way to understand the Supreme
Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence. Rather than a harm-balancing judg-
ment typical of three-tier scrutiny, the Court’s civil commitment cases are best
understood as forbidden purpose cases, a construct that is familiar in many areas
of the Court’s constitutional analysis. But the Court’s civil commitment cases tie
the search for punitive purpose to another genre of constitutional analysis, the
application of the substantive boundaries on governmental power most com-
monly associated with the specific grants of federal power. In contrast to the
normal conception of state power as plenary, limited only by the specific con-
straints of the bill or rights and the amorphous limits of ‘‘substantive due
process,’’ the Court has posited a narrowly limited ‘‘civil commitment’’ power.
The search for the forbidden purpose maps directly onto the inquiry into the
limits of this discrete and special state power. Finally, the article argues that the
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forbidden purpose/discrete power analysis provides clarity on another vexing
issue, the facial/as-applied distinction.
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I N TRODUCT ION
Sex offender civil commitment (SOCC) schemes are well into their third
decade.1 These laws confine over 5,000 individuals,2 the great majority of
whom have served their penal sentences. SOCC laws have generated com-
plex systems of bricks and mortar, treatment programming, community
supervision, and judicial and administrative direction and oversight.
SOCC laws have always been on the edge of political and legal legiti-
macy. As transparent expedients for circumventing core constitutional
constraints on the criminal justice system, SOCC laws have needed special
justification (both legal and political) to assure that their pre-crime, pre-
ventive detention methods are limited and non-expandable.3 Occupying
the rather murky and venerable ‘‘civil commitment power’’—a long-
neglected corner of our constitutional jurisprudence—the SOCC pro-
grams withstood initial constitutional challenges, but only by promising
that they were bona fide civil commitment programs.4 Now, after almost
three decades of implementation, it is appropriate for courts to hold the
states accountable for those promises.
The initial challenges concerning the constitutional legitimacy of these
laws were framed as ‘‘facial,’’ testing the validity of the statutory schemes,
1. See, e.g., Lucy Massopust & Raina Borrelli, ‘‘A Perfect Storm’’: Minnesota’s Sex Offender
Program—More Than Twenty Years Without Successful Reintegration, 41 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 706, 709–10 (2015) (‘‘In 1989, following a number of highly publicized and horrendous
crimes involving sexual assaults by recent parolees, a task force convened by the Minnesota
Attorney General recommended the resuscitation of sex offender commitments in Min-
nesota.’’ (internal quotations omitted)).
2. Jennifer E. Schneider, Ph.D., et al, SOCCPN Annual Survey of Sex Offender Civil
Commitment Programs 2016, slide 14 (on file with author).
3. Eric S. Janus, Sexual Violence, Gender Politics, and Outsider Jurisprudence, in DAN-
GEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 73, 78 (International Perspectives
on Forensic Mental Health) (Ed. B. McSherry & P. Keyzer eds., 2011).
4. ERIC JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE
RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE, ch. 2 (2006).
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rather than the propriety of applying civil commitment to the individual
challengers. As I shall argue, the fact that the courts postured the challenges
as facial is good evidence that the central constitutional question was
a forbidden purpose inquiry.5 In addition, because the laws were not fully
specified,6 sketching only in the broadest terms the complex schemes they
were spawning, judicial review was perhaps necessarily tentative. The cir-
cumstances surrounding the laws’ enactments strongly supported an infer-
ence of the ‘‘forbidden purpose’’7 of punishment.8 Yet, the courts were not
prepared to discount, ex ante, the states’ solemn avowals that the laws
created bona fide civil commitment schemes, confinement traditionally
exempt from the constraints of the ‘‘charge and conviction paradigm.’’9
In the two decades following their enactment and approval, the SOCC
schemes have evolved into concrete programs. A second wave of litigation
has emerged, testing whether the programs that have developed comport
with the promises that justified constitutional approval by the courts.
Many of these programs have belied those promises, in particular, the
cornerstone of civil commitment—the principle that confinement must
extend no longer than the duration of the grounds supporting commitment
(the ‘‘durational principle’’). In a majority of the SOCC programs, few
individuals have been discharged.10 SOCC schemes that had been touted
as legitimate treatment programs, to be completed in three or four years,
morphed into ‘‘punitive system[s] that segregate[] and indefinitely detain[]
a class of potentially dangerous individuals without the safeguards of the
criminal justice system.’’11 The fact that this is the pattern in the majority
5. See David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause,
92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 62–63 (2006).
6. Id. at 63 (‘‘Fallon’s criterion of specification is useful and sensible: it would be imprudent
for a court to strike down a statute in all its applications if the court were unsure what those
applications might turn out to look like.’’); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1346 (2000).
7. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing
the ‘‘forbidden purpose’’ of punishment).
8. Wayne Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1299–1300 (1998).
9. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992).
10. SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK, ANNUAL SURVEY
(2016).
11. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1144 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Karsjens
v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
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of the states shows a betrayal of the basic characteristic of civil commit-
ment. This is highlighted by (1) the contrast with the experience of the few
states that have released significant numbers without incident,12 and (2)
important new empirical work showing that sex offender treatment is
effective in reducing risk,13 and that the risk of sex offender recidivism
declines over time.14
This article describes the second-generation constitutional litigation
about SOCC in the United States. It focuses mostly on the Karsjens
v. Piper15 litigation concerning the Minnesota Sex Offender Program,
because this is the most well-developed litigation and can serve as a vehicle
for unpacking the confused legal tangle underlying these programs. The
constitutional issues are complex, and this article cannot do them complete
justice. It is an attempt to sketch an approach that gives the Supreme
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence some coherence and provides a frame-
work for holding SOCC laws accountable.
The central thesis of this article is that the constitutional validity of
SOCC schemes is best understood as a combination of two forms of
analysis. Central to the analysis is the notion that the power underlying
state civil commitment programs is not the plenary power of the state, but
12. In comparing Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program to those of Wisconsin and New
York, the Court noted:
However, the MSOP [Minnesota Sex Offender Program] has developed into indefinite and
lifetime detention. Since the program’s inception in 1994, no committed individual has ever
been fully discharged from the MSOP, and only three committed individuals have ever
been provisionally discharged from the MSOP. By contrast, Wisconsin has fully discharged
118 individuals and placed approximately 135 individuals on supervised release since 1994.
New York has fully discharged 30 individuals—without any recidivism incidents, placed 125
individuals on strict and intensive supervision and treatment (‘‘SIST’’) upon their initial
commitment, and transferred 64 individuals from secure facilities to SIST.
Id. at 1147.
13. J. Stinson, J. Becker, & L. McVay, Treatment Progress and Behavior Following 2 Years
of Inpatient Sex Offender Treatment: A Pilot Investigation of Safe Offender Strategies, 29(1)
SEXUAL ABUSE: A J. OF RES. AND TREATMENT 3, 19 (2017).
14. R. Hanson, A. Harris, L. Helmus, & D. Thornton, High-Risk Sex Offenders May Not
be High Risk Forever, 29(15) J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1 (2014); see also P. Lussier, &
J. Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again: The ‘‘aging’’ offender and the prediction of reoffending
in a sample of adult sex offenders, 26 JUST. Q. 827–56 (2009).
15. Karsjens, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106 (2017); see also Karsjens,
109 F. Supp. 3d at 1139.
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rather a power with inherent boundaries—the civil commitment power.
The limitations on that power arise not from standard substantive due
process analysis, but rather, inhere in the power itself. The limits are the
traditionally accepted characteristics of civil commitment. Articulated in
a series of cases, these limits are, roughly: a mental disorder predicate;16
danger to self or others;17 a promise to provide treatment, if that is avail-
able;18 and the durational principle.19
Though the source of these categorical limits is tradition, their consti-
tutional significance arises from the need to protect the legitimacy and
primacy of the ‘‘great safeguards which the law adopts in the punishment
of crime and the upholding of justice,’’20 that constrain state power in the
criminal law.21 Since civil commitment allows long-term and comprehen-
sive deprivation of liberty outside of the scope of those constraints, it must
be limited or it will swallow and de-legitimize those ‘‘great safeguards.’’
If the first thread in the analysis is this limited-power rubric, the second
is a ‘‘forbidden purpose’’ analysis,22 characteristic of many areas of consti-
tutional law.23 This analysis departs from standard substantive due process
doctrine by restricting permissible state purposes not simply based on their
16. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992); see also Stephen McAllister, Sex Offenders
and Mental Illness: A lesson In Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 268 (1998).
17. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975).
18. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 367–68 (1997); see also Eric S. Janus & Wayne A.
Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,
35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 321 (2003).
19. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (‘‘At the least, due process requires that
the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.’’).
20. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chisolm,
149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906)).
21. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 339 (1997) (arguing that the Court’s purpose scrutiny arises from ‘‘a special concern that
the challenged governmental action presents core, and not merely peripheral, constitutional
concerns’’).
22. More precisely, the jurisprudence could be described as invoking a ‘‘limited purpose’’
analysis, as the Supreme Court has in some cases characterized the boundaries on civil
commitment as limits on its purposes: roughly to address impairments arising of ‘‘mental
disorders’’ that cause harm. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 573–75. These of course correspond to the
traditional limits on the civil commitment power. Id.
23. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130
HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). See discussion infra Part III.C.
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importance (‘‘compelling’’ or ‘‘important’’ or ‘‘legitimate’’) but on their
substance.24 No matter how compelling the purpose (e.g., protection
against sexual violence), the presence of the forbidden purpose (punish-
ment) invalidates the legislation.
The two strands of analysis mirror each other: The valid exercise of
the civil commitment power within its traditional boundaries provides
a doctrinal safe harbor for escape from the inference that the indefinite
deprivation of liberty entails the forbidden purpose of punishment.25 But
the taxonomic analysis is the primary consideration. Civil confinement
outside of the permissible boundaries is invalid, whether or not it is con-
sidered punishment.26
The article begins with a brief history of SOCC laws and the initial
round of litigation that upheld the laws. In this context, it introduces the
notion that the forbidden purpose and discrete power ideas are central to
the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence. Then, the paper
discusses the Karsjens litigation as representative of second wave challenges
to these laws. The district court, based on six weeks of testimony, held that
the program was constitutionally deficient because its two-decade imple-
mentation systematically thwarted the durational principle. On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit soundly reversed. The paper asserts that the Eighth Circuit’s
decision inadequately frames the constitutional approach to civil commit-
ment laws. The final section of the paper attempts to sketch a constitutional
approach that is coherent with the Supreme Court’s decisions, and that
provides a framework for ensuring that SOCC schemes are accountable to
the Constitution.
24. Id. at 575–78.
25. This analysis keeps the limited-power and forbidden purpose strands conceptually
separate. As both Steiker and Schulhofer argue, the constitutional limitations on civil liberty
deprivation extend beyond the forbidden purpose of punishment. Carol S. Steiker, Pun-
ishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85
GEO. L.J. 775, 812 (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments
on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws,
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 69 (1996)).
26. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (‘‘[S]ubstituting confinements for
dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from
permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond
reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law.’’); see also Steiker, supra note 25, and
Schulhofer, supra note 25.
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I . SHORT H ISTORY OF SOCC LAWS AND L I T IGAT ION
SOCC laws use the civil commitment form to accomplish a decidedly non-
mental-health goal: protecting society from recidivist sexual violence. Mod-
ern SOCC laws arose out of a perception that the criminal justice approach
to recidivist sexual violence had shortcomings whose remedy within the
criminal justice system was impaired by constitutional prohibitions, specif-
ically ex post facto and double jeopardy protections. The time was the late
1980s, and in two states, Washington and Minnesota, high-profile recidivist
sexual violence took on high salience and triggered high-level task force
study.27 Both states identified key shortcomings in the criminal justice
approach to sexual violence. One shortcoming was sentences that were too
short. Another was the absence of community supervision of released of-
fenders as a result of the adoption of definite term sentences in opposition
to indeterminate sentences. Recognizing that these shortcomings could be
remedied, but that any criminal justice changes could not be applied to
individuals already in the pipeline because of ex post facto and double
jeopardy protections, the task forces recommended adapting civil commit-
ment to address recidivist sexual violence. There was strong implication
that these laws would be short-term ‘‘emergency’’ fixes, necessary only until
prospective reforms to the criminal justice system could take effect.28
The history of these SOCC laws stands in some contrast to the first
generation of sex psychopath laws, which fit much more closely with
traditional civil commitment laws. The first-generation laws, at least
initially, had support from the psychiatric community29 and were framed
as diversion programs for individuals too sick for punishment. These his-
torical facts, along with contemporaneous legislative statements, provide
strong circumstantial support for the conclusion that these new SOCC
laws had a punitive purpose.30
The original litigation challenging the validity of the SOCC laws
focused centrally on this inference of punitive intent. The Supreme Court
upheld the laws via a categorical or taxonomic approach: SOCC, despite its
27. JANUS, supra note 4, at 15.
28. OFF. OF LEGIS. AUDITOR: STATE OF MINNESOTA, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY
COMMITMENT LAW (1994), https://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ppcl.pdf.
29. JANUS, supra note 4, at 22–23.
30. Logan, supra note 8, at 1316.
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connection to the criminal justice system, avoids the forbidden purpose of
punishment precisely because it fits into a discrete category called civil
commitment. The Court’s SOCC jurisprudence is best understood not
as an application of traditional harm balancing pursuant to substantive due
process, but rather as the application of the limits of a discrete state
power—the ‘‘civil commitment power.’’
The first four laws enacted were quickly challenged in state court
proceedings, with mixed outcomes.31 The challenges were framed as
facial challenges, addressing the nature of the commitment scheme and
law itself instead of the facts of the individuals whose commitments were
being sought.
The Kansas Supreme Court held that state’s Sexually Violent Predator
(SVP) Act was unconstitutional, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
review, In re Hendricks.32 The Court split the case into two issues:
whether the Act’s criteria for commitment were consistent with substan-
tive due process, and whether the Act established ‘‘criminal proceedings’’
with a punitive intent and thus violated ex post facto and double jeopardy
protections. This issue focused on whether the Kansas SVP Act was
a punitive law.
The Court’s substantive due process analysis began by establishing
that civil commitment, as a category, is a constitutionally legitimate form
of non-criminal liberty deprivation. The constitutional question then
became whether the Kansas SVP Act was a valid civil commitment law.
The Court framed the issue as a taxonomic question, analyzing the
categorical criteria for civil commitment, rather than a dimensional
harm-balancing question.
The Court began by acknowledging that ‘‘freedom from physical
restraint ‘has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,’’’33 but that ‘‘that
31. See In re of Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246, 247 (Kan. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(invalidating Washington’s SVP law on habeas); Kansas v. Hendricks. State v. Post, 541 N.
W.2d 115, 130 (Wisc. 1995), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910,
914 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994); In re Personal Restraint of Young, 857 P.
2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (upholding Washington SVP law).
32. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3837 (U.S. 1996).
33. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 80 (1992)).
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liberty interest is not absolute.’’ The Court then states that this liberty ‘‘may
be overridden even in the civil context.’’ The Court’s proximate citation for
this assertion is Jacobson v. Massachusetts: ‘‘‘There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.’’’34
Though Jacobson involved a question of public health (vaccination), it was
actually a criminal case and provides no support for the Court’s ‘‘civil
context’’ statement.
The real work supporting this key move is historical and taxonomic.
The Court’s argument seems to be that ‘‘civil commitment’’ is a tradi-
tional category of legal intervention that has particular boundaries, and
has been used for a long time. ‘‘Such commitment statutes,’’ the Court
says, have been used in ‘‘certain narrow categories’’ since colonial times.
This history demonstrates that ‘‘involuntary civil confinement of a limited
subclass of dangerous persons’’ is not contrary to our understanding of
ordered liberty.35
Having established that civil commitment is a constitutionally valid
form of liberty deprivation, the Court shifted its attention to determining
whether the Kansas law fell within the proper boundaries of civil commit-
ment. The Court treated this as a taxonomic dispute: in its view, consti-
tutional validity requires a mental illness predicate. So, the question was
whether the Kansas law identified a proper mental illness. The Court
answered in the affirmative. That decision was controversial,36 but there
is no need to rehash its merits here. Suffice it to say the Court treated the
question not as an exercise of interest-balancing, but as a matter of histor-
ical taxonomy: the Kansas definition fell into the category of mental dis-
order traditionally underlying civil commitment schemes. This was enough
to satisfy that aspect of the Court’s constitutional taxonomy.
In Kansas v. Crane, the Court revisited the mental illness predicate
issue, and reinforced the idea that the Court’s civil commitment jurispru-
dence is taxonomic rather than harm balancing. Again, without alluding
to any form of constitutional scrutiny, the Court instructed the states that
there were boundaries around civil commitment, not based on harm
balancing, but rather on some substantive notion—apparently simply
34. Id. at 357 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Robert Schopp et al., Expert Testimony and Sexual Predator Statutes After
Hendricks, 6 EXPERT EVIDENCE 1 (1998).
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based on history and tradition—about what is properly within the civil
commitment power.37
With respect to the ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, it is clear
that the Court considered the question it had just answered—the taxo-
nomic inclusion of the SVP within the category of ‘‘civil commitment’’—
to be dispositive, characterizing the ‘‘confinement of ‘mentally unstable
individuals who present a danger to the public’ as one classic example of
nonpunitive detention.’’38 The next passage lays bare the essential struc-
ture of the Court’s argument. The argument for forbidden purpose, in
the Court’s view, is a circumstantial one, based on the obvious similarity
between criminal punishment and ‘‘potentially indefinite’’ civil commit-
ment confinement.39 The Court’s response is twofold: first, the reductio
ad absurdum—if confinement is evidence of punishment, then all civil
commitment would be unconstitutional; and second, the Kansas law
conforms to the key characteristic of valid civil commitment, the dura-
tional principle:
Hendricks focuses on his confinement’s potentially indefinite duration as
evidence of the State’s punitive intent. That focus, however, is misplaced.
Far from any punitive objective, the confinement’s duration is instead linked
to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until
his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.40
In short, the State overcomes the natural inference of punishment by
adhering to the key traditional indicia of civil commitment: a categorical,
taxonomic analysis. The analysis does not turn on any of the traditional
substantive due process, harm-balancing formulas. The state was not free to
design preventive confinement at will—or for any harm severe enough—
but rather was constrained by the requirements of the civil commitment
power: mental disorder, treatment, and the durational principle.
37. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court used a harm-balancing rubric to describe the mental-
disorder requirement (referring to ‘‘certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circum-
stances,’ where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs
the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’’’ 533 U.S.
678, 690 (2001)). But the Court has never explained how the presence of ‘‘mental illness’’
adds such unique weight to the balance that the individual’s interest is outweighed. See id.
38. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 748–49 (1987).
39. Id. at 363–64.
40. Id.
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In the years that followed, SOCC laws spread to twenty jurisdictions
with the population growing to over 5,000 detainees.41 Huge variations in
key aspects of implementation demonstrates that these schemes are merely
sketched by their implementing laws whose capacious vagueness facilitates
highly discretionary executive implementation.42 Wide variation in per
capita commitment rates and in discharge rates provide strong evidence
that the deprivations of liberty in these programs depend more on executive
whim than on the rule of law. One thing that does not vary is the contro-
versy and critique these programs engender.43
I I . KARS JENS L I T IGAT ION
A. The District Court Decision
Though not the only constitutional challenge to a state SOCC program,44
the Karsjens litigation in Minnesota was in the vanguard. Led by sophisti-
cated lawyers, this class action mounted a challenge aimed to show systemic
41. SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK, ANNUAL SURVEY
(2016).
42. Id.; see also OFF. OF LEGIS. AUDITOR: STATE OF MINNESOTA, CIVIL COMMITMENT
OF SEX OFFENDERS (2011).
43. David Robinson, Death, Assaults, and Sex Offenses: Life Behind Central New York
Psychiatric Center’s Walls, USA TODAY: Lohud (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.lohud.com/
story/news/investigations/2018/02/07/central-new-york-psychiatric-center-crimes/
1074161001/. Michael Barajas, A Prison by Any Other Name: How Texas Created a New For-
Profit Lockup, Which it Really Doesn’t Want You to Call a ‘‘Prison,’’ TEX. OBSERVER (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.texasobserver.org/a-prison-by-any-other-name/. David S. Prescott, As
Courts Censure Civil Detention Practices, is it Time for Professionals to Speak Up?, FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGIST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2015/09/as-
courts-censure-civil-detention.html. Anita Hassan & Mike Ward, Texas Sex Offender Pro-
gram a Catch-22 for Mentally Ill, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.
com/news/sex-offender-confinement-costing-states-too-much/.
44. Willis v. Palmer, 175 F.Supp.3d 1081 (2016). Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 272
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 399 (2017). R. & R., Matter of Anderson, 730 N.W.2d 570,
No. 3:13-cv-3 (N.D. 2007). Van Orden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839 (E.D. Mo. 2015), as
amended (Dec. 22, 2015), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Orden v. Schafer, No.
4:09CV00971 AGF, 2015 WL 9269251 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2015), and opinion vacated in
part on reconsideration sub nom. Van Orden v. Stringer, 262 F. Supp. 3d 887 (E.D. Mo.
2017). Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006).
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and persistent patterns of implementation that robbed the scheme of its
bona fides as a legitimate civil commitment program.
The claims in the Karsjens litigation covered a wide range, from freedom
of speech and religion, to search and seizure, to the inadequacy of the
treatment being offered. But the core claim was that the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) systematically thwarted the central legitimizing
criterion for civil commitment, the durational principle. The stark numbers
provided the scaffolding for the claim: rapid, politically fueled growth in
commitments, no discharges even on a conditional basis, and the highest
per capita commitment rate in the nation by orders of magnitude.45
A careful evidentiary case was built on this, culminating in six weeks of trial.
The state, on the other side, could do little to contest the uncontested
evidence that the MSOP was detaining many who were not dangerous. The
state’s strategy was to hobble the court’s authority to hold it accountable by
invoking the most deferential of review standards, the ‘‘shocks-the-con-
science’’ review of executive action under County of Sacramento v. Lewis.46
In an early motion to dismiss, the level-of-scrutiny dispute was joined.
Rejecting the state’s argument, the Court characterized the right to live free
of physical restraint as a fundamental right invoking strict scrutiny.47 The
Court described the plaintiffs’ claim as challenging ‘‘the systemic failure of
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the State to rectify the
continued deficiencies with the program and to protect the rights of Plain-
tiffs.’’ It acknowledged that mental health commitment is a constitutionally
valid form of liberty deprivation, ‘‘provided there is no object or purpose to
punish,’’ and placed the durational principle in the center—as a matter of
due process, it is ‘‘unconstitutional for a State to continue to confine
a harmless, mentally ill person.’’48 The Court indicated that even if the
shocks-the-conscience test were the proper test, the complaint would sur-
vive a motion to dismiss.
The District Court took six weeks of testimony about the operation of
the MSOP and made detailed findings supporting the conclusion that the
State has constructed and operated a program of long-term confinement
45. OFF. OF LEGIS. AUDITOR: STATE OF MINNESOTA, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX
OFFENDERS (2011); see also Massopust & Borrelli, supra note 1.
46. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
47. Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Karsjens v. Piper,
845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
48. Id. at 930 n. 17.
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that thwarts, in a systematic way, the duration-limiting principle of con-
stitutional civil commitment.
The Court’s analysis begins with the statute’s failure to require regular
assessments of risk and the need for continued confinement.49 As a result,
the State lacked systematic knowledge of which of its 700-plus wards could
be appropriately placed in lower security settings.50 The Court found it
‘‘undisputed’’ that non-dangerous individuals continued to be held.
Perhaps most damning, it found that the State knew that there were
individuals ‘‘who meet the reduction in custody criteria . . . but who con-
tinue to be confined at the MSOP.’’51 The Court found that the State had
actively and intentionally thwarted the duration-limitation principle, plac-
ing obstacles in the path to regaining liberty,52 refusing to affirmatively
plan for and marshal supervisory and treatment resources in the commu-
nity.53 In the end, the Court found that the State’s stewardship of the
MSOP followed ‘‘the influence of public opinion and political pressure on
all levels of the commitment process.’’’54
The Court concluded that the MSOP was unconstitutional facially and
as-applied. Essentially, the facial analysis focused on the fact that the statute
did not require periodic risk assessments. Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court concluded that the statute ‘‘is unconstitutional on its face because
no application of the statute provides sufficient constitutional protections
to render the statute narrowly tailored and results in a punitive effect and
application contrary to the purpose of civil commitment.’’55 The Court
held that ‘‘strict scrutiny also applied to [the] as-applied challenge because
the claim involve[d] the infringement of a fundamental right.’’ The as-
applied analysis addressed the systematic failure of the state to ensure
compliance with the durational principle.56
In hindsight, one can identify several vulnerabilities in the district
court’s analysis. First, its use of strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring left its
49. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F.Supp.3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Karsjens
v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1164.
52. Id. at 1149.
53. Id. at 1153.
54. Id. at 1174 n.7.
55. Id. at 1170.
56. Id.
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analysis vulnerable to the argument that the Supreme Court has never
definitively specified a level of scrutiny for civil commitment cases. Second,
the court marginalized the implementation evidence by bifurcating the
facial and as-applied analyses, failing to explicitly include the implementa-
tion evidence as part of the facial challenge, and characterizing the imple-
mentation evidence as solely part of the as-applied claim. This allowed the
appellate court to ignore the implementation evidence under the guise of
a very deferential level of scrutiny.
B. Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion revealing unalloyed hostility
to the constitutional claims. Its constitutional theory, if it stands, would
spell the end of any meaningful judicial accountability for civil commit-
ment laws. The Court’s decision is based on three questionable moves
about the applicable levels of scrutiny. First, the Court dismissed the idea
that the case involved a fundamental liberty interest, which would trigger
a strict scrutiny review. Second, the Court adopted a superficial, but very
consequential, facial/as-applied classification and tied it to the level-of-
scrutiny analysis. Third, the Court ignored altogether the District Court’s
findings about the systematic thwarting of the durational principle.
But the Court’s analysis suffers from a deeper error, reflecting a fun-
damental mis-framing of the constitutional issue involved. The Court
failed to address the taxonomic question, whether the systematic failure
to implement the durational principle disqualified MSOP as a bona fide
civil commitment scheme and, for that reason, required an inference of
punitive intent.
The Court began its level-of-scrutiny analysis by pointing out that ‘‘[t]he
Supreme Court has not expressly identified the proper level of scrutiny to
apply when reviewing constitutional challenges to civil commitment
statutes.’’57 The Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has, in
several cases, used language akin to ‘‘fundamental’’ to describe the liberty
interest curtailed in civil commitment, referencing as an example the
Supreme Court’s characterization of ‘‘civil commitment as a ‘significant
deprivation of liberty’’’ in Addington.58
57. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106 (2017).
58. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
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But in a key move, the Court stated that the Supreme Court ‘‘has never
declared that persons who pose a significant danger to themselves or others
possess a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint.’’59
The Court explained, quoting from Hendricks: ‘‘Although freedom from
physical restraint ‘has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,’ that liberty inter-
est is not absolute.’’60 Continuing, the Court cited this language from
Hendricks: ‘‘It thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement
of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding
of ordered liberty.’’
Finally, the Court completed its scrutiny analysis by referencing the
original articulation of the durational principle in Jackson: ‘‘At the least,
due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted.’’61 From this the Court drew the conclusion that the proper
scrutiny for the facial challenge is whether there is a ‘‘rational relation-
ship to a legitimate government purpose,’’ a standard the Court called
‘‘highly deferential.’’62 Noting that the statute allows for a confined
person to petition for release, the Court concluded that rational basis
is satisfied.
The Court’s assertion that people who ‘‘pose a significant danger to
themselves or others’’63 do not ‘‘possess a fundamental liberty interest in
freedom from physical restraint’’ is highly problematic. It is possible to
interpret the Court’s pronouncements as picking out ‘‘dangerous’’ people,
or perhaps dangerous mentally ill people, and saying that they in particu-
lar—as opposed to others—don’t have a fundamental interest in their
physical liberty. Under this reading, dangerous individuals—or perhaps
more charitably, committed dangerous individuals—lack a fundamental
interest in their own liberty. But this seems an odd and unsupportable
construct. After all, strict scrutiny analysis is about determining when the
state can impinge on a fundamental liberty, so it hardly makes sense to
create a classification that impinges on that right—and then claim that that
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)).
61. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
62. Id. at 409.
63. Id. at 407.
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classification is immune from the very scrutiny reserved for analyzing
constraints on the right.
A more charitable (and constitutionally sound) interpretation of the
Court’s analysis would be this: ‘‘civil commitment’’ is a constitutionally
allowable form of liberty deprivation for ‘‘dangerous’’ individuals (more
precisely, mentally ill dangerous individuals). But this should have led the
Court to the real question posed by the plaintiffs in Karsjens: whether the
MSOP fit the category of valid civil commitment schemes. As is discussed
more fully below, this is a categorical question of state power and purpose
that the Court considered outside of the harm-balancing context of scru-
tiny analysis.
The Court’s next step—taking the Jackson ‘‘reasonable relationship’’ and
translating that to ‘‘rational basis’’ scrutiny—is a category mistake. The
Court has taken part of the substantive criteria for a bona fide civil com-
mitment scheme and transformed that to a similar sounding—but quite
different—level of scrutiny. But more importantly, the Court uses that
slight-of-hand to truncate its examination of the State’s systematic failure
to implement that very signal of civil commitment validity.
As argued below,64 the Court incorrectly framed the nature of the facial
challenge. It failed to recognize that the plaintiffs’ systemic implementation
evidence goes to the validity of the scheme, constituting a classic facial
challenge based on purpose and legislative power. Instead, the Court used
a questionably derived deferential level of scrutiny to avert its gaze from the
scheme as implemented.
Next, the Court turned to what was styled the as-applied challenge. As
has been mentioned, the real core of the plaintiffs’ challenge comprised
the systematic thwarting of the durational principle. The Court again
sidestepped these findings and their potential consequences. In addition,
the Court framed the legal context so as to generate maximum deference
to the state. Holding that County of Sacramento v. Lewis65 provided the
correct standard of review, the Court used the most deferential standard
imaginable, holding that the state’s executive implementation would
stand unless it shocked the conscience, as measured by whether the
conduct was:
64. See infra Part III.B.
65. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
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egregious or outrageous . . . so severe . . . so disproportionate to the need
presented, and . . . so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely
careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane
abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.66
The Court did not explain why the standard developed in Lewis to
address a tort-like claim involving a high-speed police chase, should be
applied to the twenty-five-year pattern of executive and judicial imple-
mentation described in the Karsjens findings. There is also no clear
Supreme Court precedent for treating systematic and longstanding pat-
terns of executive implementation via the Lewis standard.67 But the
adoption of the highly deferential standard gave the Court leave to ignore
the implementation evidence, the subject of the District Court’s metic-
ulous findings. Where the District Court had seen a systematic abandon-
ment of the durational principle, the Circuit Court was satisfied that the
law provided a right to petition for discharge, and dismissed the persistent
obstruction of that right on the grounds that ‘‘[t]he Supreme Court . . .
has not recognized a broader due process right to appropriate or effective
or reasonable treatment. . . . ’’68
The Court of Appeals decision offers states carte blanche to enact civil
commitment laws with little constitutional oversight; that minimal account-
ability is reduced nearly to zero for the actual implementation of commit-
ment schemes. According to the Court, anything goes so long as it is not
‘‘malicious’’ or ‘‘sadistic.’’ For sure, systematic obstruction of the durational
principle does not count in the Court’s crabbed view of accountability.
But the Supreme Court has consistently provided for constitutional
accountability in civil commitment cases, with key language strongly
suggesting that the Court is committed to correcting instances of
improper implementation.69 The article turns now to a proposal for
66. Karsjens, 845 F.3d at 408.
67. See Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the
Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 981, 994–98 (2000).
68. Karsjens, 845 F.3d at 410.
69. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (‘‘State courts, in addition to federal courts,
remain competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges to civil confinement schemes arising
under the Federal Constitution. . . . [D]ue process requires that the conditions and duration
of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
persons are committed.’’); see also infra, Part III.C.
BEYOND STR ICT SCRUT INY | 361
framing the constitutional issues in a way that is consistent with the
Court’s jurisprudence.
I I I . COHERENCE ON CONST I TUT IONAL DOCTR INE :
BEYOND STR ICT SCRUT INY
A. Rights vs. Power
1. Introduction: Validity vs. Application Contexts
The thesis of this article is that challenges to SOCC schemes, that are based
on systemic failure to comply with constitutional standards, should be
framed as facial validity challenges, applying a categorical, taxonomic deter-
mination of the limits of the state’s civil commitment power rather than
the traditional level of scrutiny and the dimensional harm balancing it
entails.70 Often articulated as a forbidden purpose analysis, this validity
inquiry rests on an objective determination, whether the scheme exhibits
the four characteristics of a bona fide civil commitment scheme: a mental
disorder predicate, a dangerousness requirement, the provision of
treatment if it is available, and adherence to the durational principle.71
Constitutional validity requires compliance with all four criteria.
Once it is determined that a civil commitment scheme is a valid exercise
of the civil commitment power, a second level of analysis emerges: what
level of deference will the courts give to states implementing a valid
scheme? That question is secondary to and conceptually separate from the
validity question. The first context will be referred to as the validity context
and the second, the application context.
The argument presented here is essentially descriptive: it attempts to
reverse-engineer the Supreme Court’s holdings, as well as its rhetoric, about
civil commitment. A useful description of the Supreme Court’s civil com-
mitment jurisprudence must to be able to explain the following touchpoints:
70. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 368 (arguing that ‘‘if the Court adopts constitutionally-
rooted purpose scrutiny, it will properly invalidate improperly-motivated legislation or
regulation even when the legislation falls outside the ‘heightened scrutiny’ tiers of the
Court’s current doctrine’’).
71. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 367–68 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 82 (1992); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.
S. 715, 738 (1972); Janus & Logan, supra note 18, at 321.
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1. The Supreme Court has refused to approve a general ‘‘jurisprudence
of prevention,’’72 a principle approving across-the-board preventive
civil confinement.
2. On the contrary, when the Court has sought to answer the key
question—when can the state lock a person away without using the
rigid rules of the ‘‘charge and conviction paradigm’’?73—the answer
is only in a few, discrete circumstances, one of which is the tradi-
tional mental health intervention called ‘‘civil commitment.’’74
3. Some aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence have the characteristics of
‘‘heightened scrutiny,’’ and other aspects are akin to more deferential
review, but the Court has never suggested that state civil commit-
ment programs are virtually exempt from constitutional scrutiny.
Four potential frames deserve consideration as potential doctrinal ex-
planations for the Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence. The most
straightforward candidate, adopted by both courts in Karsjens, is the usual
tiered scrutiny analysis, based in part on an initial determination of
whether freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental right. A variation
on the fundamental rights analysis redefines the right at issue, focusing not
simply on the deprivation of liberty, but on the context in which the
deprivation takes place. This posits a fundamental right to be subjected
to liberty deprivation only in the ‘‘charge and conviction’’ context of robust
constitutional protections, rather than in the civil-regulatory context of
relaxed protections.
Both of these approaches engage in traditional harm balancing, but both
fall short as descriptors for the validity context. The other two approaches,
in contrast, are categorical, and do not involve the explicit application of
some specific level of scrutiny or the related balancing of harms. These
approaches involve purpose analysis and a categorical conceptualization of
a discrete state power. Forbidden-purpose analysis judges whether the
legislative scheme has the forbidden purpose of punishment. Legislative-
72. Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-
Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989).
73. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 2–14, Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 407 (8th Cir.), 2017 WL 2792543.
74. Id.; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (‘‘We have also held that in
certain narrow circumstances persons who pose a danger to others or to the community may
be subject to limited confinement and it is on these cases.’’); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.
S. 739, 750–51 (1987).
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power analysis examines whether the scheme is a valid exercise of a specific
kind of state power, the civil commitment power.
2. Freedom from Confinement as a Fundamental Right—Strict Scrutiny
and Harm Balancing
We first examine the traditional fundamental-rights, heightened-scrutiny
analysis under the substantive due process clause. There is good evidence
that the Court is using some sort of heightened scrutiny. Justice Kennedy
observed that the Court has ‘‘often subjected to heightened due process
scrutiny, with regard to both purpose and duration,’’ deprivations of
physical liberty that are outside of the criminal justice paradigm.75 On
multiple occasions, the Court has made clear that states do not have
plenary free rein in locking people up outside the criminal justice para-
digm.76 These substantive limits on civil commitment cannot be ex-
plained by a minimalist arbitrariness standard. And although the
Supreme Court has never explicitly identified what level of scrutiny it
was employing, a number of state courts have explicitly adopted a strict
scrutiny approach.77
There are three ways in which the fundamental rights analysis does not
fully explain the Court’s jurisprudence. First, this analysis proves too little. It
does not explain why civil preventive detention has categorical limits. As long
as the goal is ‘‘compelling’’—and the prevention of various forms of violence
would seem to suffice—the harm-balancing calculus of strict scrutiny can
75. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
76. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Foucha, 504 U.S. 71 (1991); Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (197).
77. In re Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. 2003) (En Banc) (applying strict scrutiny to
equal protection claim challenging Missouri SVP law because civil commitment impinges
on the fundamental right to liberty.); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Wisc. 1995) (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155) (Wisconsin SVP law restricts a fundamental liberty and thus
‘‘the challenged statute must further a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.’’); In re Savala, 147 Wash. App. 798 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); In re Young,
857 P.2d 989, 1000 (Wash. 1993) (En Banc) (citing United States v. Uni, 481 U.S. 739, 750
(1987)); In re Moye, 22 Cal.3d 457 (Cal. 1978); Deborah L. Morris, Constitutional
Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process
Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 599 (1997); See also, In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171,
181 (Minn. 1996) (reaffirming that when ‘‘the fundamental right to liberty is at stake’’ the
commitment statute ‘‘is subject to strict scrutiny.’’).
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easily be satisfied.78 In particular, this analysis cannot explain why civil
confinement is limited to individuals with a mental abnormality.79 Strict
scrutiny on its own does not rule out a ‘‘jurisprudence of prevention’’ that
allows for the limitless expansion of non-criminal deprivation of liberty.80
On the other hand, strict scrutiny seems to prove too much. If physical
confinement triggers strict scrutiny, why is the whole of criminal law exempt
from such careful examination?81 Although criminal law is highly con-
strained, mostly by constitutionally based procedural rules, the policy choices
within the criminal law (definition of crimes, length of sentence) are not
subjected to strict scrutiny.82 Similarly, key policy choices within civil com-
mitment schemes—such as the definition of mental disorder,83 the precise
design of treatment,84 or the differential treatment of various classifications
of commitment85—are not closely scrutinized either.86 Jackson also requires
only a ‘‘reasonable’’ relationship between purpose and duration.87
78. See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001 (‘‘It is irrefutable that the State has a com-
pelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions.’’).
79. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 338 (noting that in ‘‘traditional strict scrutiny’’ analysis,
‘‘strict scrutiny seems to presume a potentially unlimited number of ‘compelling govern-
ment interests’’’ and does not provide any guidance in ‘‘evaluating the ‘compellingness’’’ of
governmental purposes.)
80. See Steiker, supra note 25; cf. Foucha 504 U.S. at 1787 (‘‘It would also be only a step
away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present system which, with
only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, in-
carcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal
law.’’).
81. See Foucha at 1792–93 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (‘‘The same heightened due process
scrutiny does not obtain, though, once the State has met its burden of proof and obtained
an adjudication. It is well settled that upon compliance with In re Winship, the State may
incarcerate on any reasonable basis.’’ (citations omitted)); Chapman v. United States, 500
U.S. 453, 465 (1991); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
82. See Steiker, supra note 25.
83. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); McAllister, supra note 16.
84. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982).
85. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (refusing to determine whether strict
scrutiny standard applied to review of involuntary commitment statute because the
respondent had argued in the lower courts that the statutory scheme was subject to a rational
basis review); cf. People v. McKee, 47 Cal. 4th 1172 (Cal. 2010) [hereinafter McKee I]; People
v. McKee, 207 Cal. App. 4th 1325 (Cal. 2012) [hereinafter McKee II] (courts applying strict
scrutiny analysis to equal protection claim regarding civil commitment law differences).
86. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 16, at 281.
87. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738–39 (1972).
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Finally, the Eighth Circuit’s no-fundamental-right, high-deference anal-
yses fall entirely short. These minimalist doctrines cannot explain why the
Supreme Court has placed clear limits on civil confinement in cases stretch-
ing back decades. Even Stephen McAllister, who co-authored the state’s
briefs in Hendricks, rejects rational-basis review. He asserts instead that the
Court has applied ‘‘reasonableness’’ review. This view puts the burden on
the state to ‘‘prove to the courts the actual purposes of the statute, that
those purposes are constitutionally legitimate, and that the statute reason-
ably serves those purposes.’’88 But aside from acknowledging that consti-
tutional review pays attention to the ‘‘legitimacy’’ of the state’s purposes,
McAllister’s framework cannot explain the particular categorical character-
istics of civil commitment.
3. A Focus on Framing the Fundamental Right
A second way of framing the key validity question is suggested by Foucha89
and Crane.90 Both cases suggest that the fundamental interest is not the
liberty deprivation itself, but rather the deprivation of liberty outside of the
protections of the criminal law. The state, under this theory, would need to
justify its abandonment of the ‘‘great safeguards’’ of criminal law. The
Court put it this way in Foucha:
Furthermore, . . . the State does not explain why its interest would not be
vindicated by the ordinary criminal processes involving charge and con-
viction, the use of enhanced sentences for recidivists, and other permissible
ways of dealing with patterns of criminal conduct. These are the normal
means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct.91
Similarly, in Crane, the Court emphasized the
constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender
subject to civil commitment ‘‘from other dangerous persons who are perhaps
88. McAllister, supra note 16, at 282.
89. ‘‘Furthermore, if Foucha committed criminal acts while at Feliciana, such as assault,
the State does not explain why its interest would not be vindicated by the ordinary criminal
processes involving charge and conviction, the use of enhanced sentences for recidivists,
and other permissible ways of dealing with patterns of criminal conduct. These are the
normal means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct.’’ Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 82 (1992).
90. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
91. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82.
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more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.’’ That
distinction is necessary lest ‘‘civil commitment’’ become a ‘‘mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence’’—functions properly those of criminal
law, not civil commitment.92
That role, the Court suggested, would be played by the mental disorder
element, which ‘‘must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual
offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects
him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist con-
victed in an ordinary criminal case.’’93 In other words, to use civil com-
mitment, the state has to prove something (mental disorder) that supports
abandoning the criminal law and its protections.94
By insisting that civil commitment is interstitial to criminal law, the
danger of an unrestrained regime of civil preventive detention is greatly
diminished. The doctrine would also explain why strict scrutiny would not
be applied in judging criminal laws.95 Unfortunately, there is not much
beyond those two supreme court pronouncements to support the notion
that civil commitment is valid only in the interstices unreachable by the
criminal law.96
4. Forbidden Purpose Analysis
A third approach is to understand the Court’s civil commitment cases as
resting on a ‘‘forbidden purpose’’ analysis. Any number of constitutional
doctrines rest constitutional validity on the absence of some particular
forbidden purpose.97 The doctrine in civil commitment cases rests on
92. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S., at 360).
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Steiker, supra note 25, citing with approval Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 83–94
(arguing that ‘‘‘[c]ivil’ deprivation of liberty should be permissible only as a gap-filler, to
solve problems that the criminal process cannot address.’’).
96. See Eric Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Bound-
aries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157 (1996) (arguing for a gap-filler approach
to SOCC). But see In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999) [hereinafter Linehan II]
(rejecting the gap-filling approach).
97. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 416 (1996) (demonstrating that ‘‘a wide range
of First Amendment rules—indeed, the essential structure of the doctrine—are best and
most easily understood as devices to detect the presence of illicit motive.’’); see Bhagwat,
supra note 21.
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the simple syllogism, repeated several times by the Court: ‘‘As he was not
convicted, he may not be punished.’’98
Forbidden purpose analysis confounds the usual strict scrutiny/rational
basis dichotomy because it does not employ the harm-balancing approach
that characterizes the scrutiny cases. Thus, in forbidden purpose cases,
neither a compelling interest nor means narrowly tailored to attain that
interest, can redeem a scheme from a forbidden purpose.99
The Supreme Court has made it clear that purpose analysis—ferreting
out the forbidden ‘‘purpose to punish,’’100—is at the center of its civil
commitment cases. In Hendricks it is the ‘‘threshold matter.’’ In Addington
the Court accepted a diminished standard of proof only because ‘‘[i]n a civil
commitment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense.’’101
Despite its promise, this approach also seems to prove too little, at least
standing on its own. If forbidden purpose analysis were the only explana-
tion, there would be no real limit to preventive detention. As long as the
government could claim a regulatory purpose—and presumably protection
from harm would suffice as such purpose—confinement outside of the
charge and conviction paradigm would be permitted.102 Justice Scalia
warned against such an expansive notion of preventive confinement:
It is unthinkable that the Executive could render otherwise criminal grounds
for detention noncriminal merely by disclaiming an intent to prosecute, or
by asserting that it was incapacitating dangerous offenders rather than
punishing wrongdoing.103
But when the forbidden purpose analysis is coupled with the discrete power
analysis, to which we now turn, a more coherent foundation emerges.
98. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82 n.4 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983)).
99. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 356, Figure 1. Some commentators understand strict
scrutiny as a way for courts to address constitutional standards that are, at bottom, for-
bidden purpose standards. But see Kagan, supra note 97, at 453 (‘‘the strict scrutiny stan-
dard—indeed, each component of it—is best understood as an evidentiary device that
allows the government to disprove the implication of improper motive arising from the
content-based terms of a law.’’).
100. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
101. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
102. Steiker, supra note 25, at 812 n.194 (arguing that the absence of punishment cannot
alone account for the desirable limits on ‘‘preventive confinement’’).
103. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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5. Discrete Power Analysis
The final approach posits a discrete state power—the civil commitment
power—as the font from which civil commitment programs are authorized.
As will be discussed, this power analysis is tied closely to the forbidden
purpose analysis. In the discrete power analysis, the constitutional question
is whether the civil commitment scheme is the sort authorized by the civil
commitment power of the state. As with litigation involving the enumerated
powers of the United States, the power is not plenary, and its limits are
inherent, rather than arising externally from the nature of the liberty interest
being infringed.104 Thus, like the forbidden purpose theory, analysis under
the discrete power rubric does not invoke harm balancing or a determination
of the fundamental nature of the particular liberty interest involved.105
The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the ‘‘civil commitment
power’’ as a discrete category of state power, separate from the state’s
generic and plenary power. Chief Justice Burger’s discussion in Donaldson
is illustrative.106 He refers to the ‘‘civil commitment power’’ and the ‘‘his-
toric parens patriae power.’’107 He posits that each of these powers has
constitutional limits108 and that the ‘‘the justifications for one may not be
invoked to rationalize another.’’109 In a similar vein, the Court referred to
the ‘‘parens patriae power’’ in both Allen and Addington, making clear that
this source of state power has specific boundaries.110
State power is often characterized as plenary, in contrast to the ‘‘limited’’
powers of the federal government. Plenary state powers are constrained
104. Franklin, supra note 5, at 83.
105. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
106. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
107. Id. at 583.
108. Id. (stating for example that the ‘‘parens patriae power . . . must rest upon a legis-
lative determination that it is compatible with the best interests of the affected class and that
its members are unable to act for themselves’’).
109. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 581–84. See also United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 146
(2012) (referring to the ‘‘federal civil-commitment power’’); see also NORVAL MORRIS,
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982) (positing that the state has two discrete powers
to confine: the criminal law power and the mental health power).
110. ‘‘The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care
to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state
also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies of some who are mentally ill.’’ Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (quoting
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
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by the due process clause. Some of the constraints come from ‘‘fundamen-
tal’’ rights, specifically privileged types of actions (speech, religion, etc.),
but beyond that, according to the received wisdom, the state’s plenary
power is limited only by a prohibition on arbitrariness via the substantive
due process clause.111
The argument is that the limits on civil commitment cannot be ex-
plained adequately as a product of either of these due process doctrines.
Rather, civil commitment is authorized by a discrete font of state power,
whose boundaries arise not from a generic notion of arbitrariness, but as
a corollary of the strict regime of restraints the Constitution places on the
states’ exercise of their criminal justice power. Foucha is the perfect exam-
ple. Framing the constitutional question as whether the Louisiana law fits
‘‘one of those carefully limited exceptions permitted by the Due Process
Clause,’’112 the Court answered in the negative: ‘‘We decline to take a sim-
ilar view of a law like Louisiana’s. . . . ’’113 The boundaries of the civil
commitment power are constitutionally required for the preservation of
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.114 The Court looks to the
age-old, and limited, form of civil commitment to define the very narrow
exceptions to the charge and conviction paradigm.
6. Forbidden Purpose and Discrete Power: Understood Together
Finally, we can observe that the forbidden purpose analysis and the discrete
power analysis are fundamentally linked. The Court has emphasized that
avoiding a forbidden purpose is the lynchpin for validity. Yet the court
considers the bona fides of a state’s civil commitment scheme to be safe-
harbor, objective proof of a suitable purpose. Again and again, the Court
says that the way to determine whether liberty deprivation is punishment,
is to ascertain whether it fits the criteria for civil commitment.
111. Chesney, supra note 67. Jane R. Bambauerd & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and
Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281, 282 (2015).
112. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 n.6 (1992).
113. Id.
114. ‘‘It would also be only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness
for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible
confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable
doubt to have violated a criminal law.’’ Id. at 83.
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This passage in Hendricks captures the essence of the Court’s approach:
Where the State has ‘‘disavowed any punitive intent’’; limited confinement
to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict
procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated from the
general prison population and afforded the same status as others who have
been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and
permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer
dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive
intent.
In other words, if the confinement scheme has the characteristics of a bona
fide civil commitment scheme, the state has negated the inference that total
confinement is undertaken with punitive intent.115
B. Facial and As-Applied Analysis
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion usefully brought to the foreground the dis-
tinction between facial and as-applied analysis. But its analysis succumbed to
a superficial understanding of that complex and obscure distinction. Some
clarity would help bring coherence into civil commitment jurisprudence.
First, facial challenges question the constitutional validity of a statutory
scheme, whereas as-applied challenges question the use of a valid scheme in
a particular manner.116 Whether a particular legal defect falls into one
category or the other is a matter of substantive law.117
Second, scholars generally recognize two distinct types of facial chal-
lenges. In ‘‘overbreadth’’ challenges, the assertion is that the legislature has
sought to regulate activity that is protected from regulation. In rule-validity
challenges, the challenge points to a constitutional defect with the legisla-
tive rule itself. Courts often cite the Salerno formulation of facial challenges:
Since facial challenges are thought to assert that the enactment is invalid, it
is generally thought that overbreadth challenges (at least outside of the First
Amendment context) work only where every imaginable application of the
rule is constitutionally inappropriate.118 In rule-validity challenges, on the
other hand, the defect in the rule itself means that it is not valid in any
115. See id.
116. Franklin, supra note 5, at 53–58.
117. Id. at 62–63.
118. Id.; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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circumstances, even those that might otherwise be reachable by valid
rules.119 The Salerno formulation, thus, is normative for overbreadth
challenges but simply descriptive of rule-validity challenges.120
For example, in In re Blodgett,121 the Minnesota Supreme Court inter-
preted an early challenge to Minnesota’s SOCC law as an overbreadth
challenge, and rejected it, essentially because it did not comply with the
Salerno formulation for a facial challenges: ‘‘The fact that the statute has
been misapplied on occasion is not a valid criticism of the statute itself. The
remedy for misapplication is not to declare the statute unconstitutional but
to appeal erroneous decisions and get them reversed.’’122
Valid-rule facial challenges come in two related forms. Most often, they
are based on forbidden purpose analysis.123 Sometimes these cases are
based on the assertion that the legislation is outside of the delineated power
of the government. Commerce clause cases fall into this latter category.124
Third, standard understandings of facial challenges acknowledge
that they are based on statutes as written, and as authoritatively con-
strued.125 The ubiquitous use of implementation evidence in forbidden
purpose cases suggests that the ‘‘authoritative construction’’ can be
119. Franklin, supra note 5, at 78 (‘‘By contrast, on the formalist conception,
constitutional-powers provisions simply extend until they exhaust their own internally
defined scope. Any limitations on the governmental authority conferred by a power-
granting provision, therefore, are already present by negative implication in the provision’s
own definition, rather than being carved out as oases of privileged conduct. The court’s task
is to adumbrate the boundary that separates authorized from unauthorized regulation, not
to excise discrete zones of exempted conduct.’’).
120. Franklin, supra note 5, at 56–57 (stating that ‘‘A valid rule facial challenge is
a constitutional challenge that, if successful, satisfies Salerno’s ‘no set of circumstances’
language. That language, however, does not set forth an application-specific method of
proof or a facial challenge ‘test,’ but is rather a descriptive claim about a statute that on its
face expresses an invalid rule of law.’’).
121. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).
122. Id.
123. Franklin, supra note 5, at 63 (‘‘Most importantly from the point of view of this
article, facial challenges often succeed where a court concludes that a statute is motivated by
an impermissible legislative purpose.’’); Kagan, supra note 97; see also Bhagwat, supra note
21, at 332–33 nn.128, 129, 147, 152 (discussing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) as
well as United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag-burning case) as being based on
forbidden purpose analysis support facial invalidation of statutes despite the fact that the
conduct at issue could have been prohibited in a properly motivated statute).
124. Franklin, supra note 5, at 59–60.
125. Id. at 44.
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ascertained from patterns of executive implementation as well as judicial
pronouncements.126
Examining key cases, it is clear that the Supreme Court considers the
discrete power and forbidden purpose challenges to civil commitment laws
to be facial challenges. Consider Foucha. That case addressed a petition for
release from commitment of an individual who was no longer mentally ill.
The governing statute prohibited the release of dangerous people, even if
they were not mentally ill.127 The Court could have treated the case as an
as-applied challenge, simply holding that this non-mentally ill individual
could not be held. Since the statute could conceivably be applied to some
people whose continued confinement would be proper (i.e., mentally ill and
dangerous individuals), a facial challenge under an overbreadth theory would
not have succeeded. But the Court treated the challenge as a discrete power
challenge, identifying the statute as outside of the civil commitment power of
the state, and by that reasoning held the statute unconstitutional.128 This
analysis is similar to the Court’s analysis in other discrete power cases, notably
the two commerce clause cases, Lopez129 and Morrison,130 in which the Court
struck down statutes despite the fact that some of the conduct covered by the
statute clearly could have been regulable under the commerce clause.131
The Court also considers forbidden purpose to be a facial defect in a civil
commitment scheme. In Seling, the Court characterized the challenge to
the ‘‘civil nature’’ of the statue as a facial challenge, going to the ‘‘validity of
the Washington Act as a civil confinement scheme.’’132 A showing of
punitive purpose, the Court suggested, ‘‘undermine[s] the validity’’ of the
statute, and would require the release of all who are held.133 This associ-
ation of forbidden purpose with facial invalidity is common in other areas
of constitutional law, as well.134
126. See infra Part III.C.
127. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
128. Id. at 84.
129. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
130. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
131. Franklin, supra note 5, at 94 (‘‘But perhaps the best evidence that the Court is
motivated by an underlying concern with legislative purpose is the fact that it adjudicates
Commerce Clause cases as valid-rule facial challenges.’’)
132. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 264 (2001).
133. Id.
134. Franklin, supra note 5.
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This leads us to the next step of the argument, that evidence of system-
atic patterns of implementation is relevant in the forbidden purpose and
discrete power contexts.
C. Implementation Evidence: Purpose and Pretext, Authoritative
Construction
SOCC schemes are complex amalgams of authorizing legislation giving
rise to brick and mortar institutions, treatment programs, community-
based supervision and housing, and judicial and administrative policies
and adjudications.135 The law itself is a sketch; judgments about purpose
and compliance with the limits of the civil commitment power can be
made only tentatively at the beginning. The important question is
whether the fully implemented scheme is a valid exercise of the state’s
civil commitment power.
There are three ways to think of implementation evidence. First, it can
be seen as evidence of the state’s real purpose. Second is to look at it as the
authoritative construction of the meaning of the statute, showing that it is
outside of the state’s civil commitment power. This article has demon-
strated that these two inquiries are tightly tied together. Third, one can
view problematic implementation as the misapplication of an otherwise
proper civil commitment law. The first two approaches invoke the validity
context, addressing the issues of state power and purpose. The third
approach invokes what has been referred to as the application context.
In multiple contexts, constitutional validity is dependent on the pur-
pose of a governmental program,136 and this purpose is characteristically
determined by an examination of the program’s actual implementation.
As early as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in ‘‘pass[ing] upon the validity’’ of an
ordinance, the Court held it was ‘‘not obliged to reason from the probable
to the actual . . . for the cases present the ordinances in actual oper-
ation. . . . ’’137 In one of the seminal forbidden purpose cases, Justice
135. See, e.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (describing how Minnesota’s
SOCC ‘‘system,’’ originally described as a ‘‘thirty-two-month’’ program, ‘‘developed into
indefinite and lifetime detention.’’); see also Massopust & Borrelli, supra note 1.
136. Franklin, supra note 5, at 62 (‘‘Doctrinal tests that turn at least in part on an
examination of legislative purpose are often used under the Equal Protection, Free Speech,
Dormant Commerce, and Establishment Clauses.’’).
137. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
374 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 21 | NO . 3 | SUMMER 2018
Stewart stated that impact is probative evidence of the government’s
purpose because ‘‘normally the actor is presumed to have intended the
natural consequences of his deeds.’’138 Forbidden purpose analysis gov-
erns in numerous constitutional contexts, and the Court has routinely
looked to implementation evidence to ascertain the real, rather than
sham, purpose of a governmental scheme. The list of constitutional con-
texts includes free-exercise,139 search and seizure,140 establishment of
religion,141 free speech,142 sex discrimination,143 and dormant commerce
clause.144 Even Justice Scalia acknowledged that implementation
138. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
139. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535, 540
(1993) (in determining the purpose of a facially neutral set of ordinances, ‘‘we may determine
the city council’s object from both direct and circumstantial evidence.’’ ‘‘Apart from the
text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.’’).
140. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (in evaluating program to
screen pregnant women for drug use, the court examined the ‘‘purpose actually served’’ by
the policy, considering ‘‘all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant primary
purpose.’’) City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46–47 (2000) (examining a pro-
gram of drug interdiction checkpoints, searching for a forbidden purpose: ‘‘courts routinely
engage in this [purpose inquiry] in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of
sifting abusive governmental conduct from that which is lawful.’’).
141. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (In the First Amendment
establishment of religion context, the Court has frequently acknowledged that ‘‘[w]hile
the Court is normally deferential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is required
that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham.’’); Wallace v. Jaffee, 472
U.S. 38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)., (‘‘[the state’s] secular purpose must be ‘sin-
cere’; a law will not pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated by the
legislature is merely a ‘sham.’’’).
142. Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 316–17, 348 (discussing Turner Broadcasting, in which the
Supreme Court, having found that the regulations were ‘‘content-neutral,’’ remanded for
a ‘‘rigorous lower court review’’ as to whether the regulations ‘‘actually advanced the gov-
ernment’s stated objectives’’).
143. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (finding state’s reasons
for maintaining a male-only school pretextual).
144. Franklin, supra note 5, at 96 (‘‘With respect to the Dormant Commerce Clause,
Donald Regan has argued that the Court’s decisions . . . are best explained by a principle that
outlaws legislation enacted with an impermissible purpose.’’). David S. Day, The ‘‘Mature’’
Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination
Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2007) (citing Ft. Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992), as an example of the use of implementation
evidence to determine forbidden purpose).
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evidence could be relevant in determining whether a statute is civil or
criminal in the ex post facto context.145
D. Remedies—and Purpose Analysis
Two final topics will complete this inquiry. First, how is it determined
whether a constitutional challenge is—as a matter of substantive law—
facial, in that it addresses the validity of the scheme, or as-applied, in that it
addresses the appropriateness of a particular application of a valid scheme?
As has been suggested, the context may well determine the intensity of
constitutional scrutiny. Putting the question into the concrete context of
the Karsjens litigation: Should the case be framed as a challenge to the
validity of the Minnesota SVP scheme, or as a failure to properly imple-
ment a valid scheme? The state might rightly claim more deference in the
latter context than in the former.
The preceding discussion provides the framework for an answer. For-
bidden purpose challenges are typically understood as facial. So too are
limited-power challenges, at least in some contexts.146 The direct connec-
tion between the forbidden purpose and the civil commitment power
analyses strengthens the argument that the latter, as well as the former,
should be framed as facial challenges. It follows that a challenge should be
viewed as facial where the implementation evidence is pervasive and sys-
tematic enough to establish authoritatively the state’s purpose. In other
words, the pattern of implementation, representing the authoritative con-
struction of the law, places the law outside of the limited civil commitment
power of the state. Implementation that is erratic or aberrational may
properly be evaluated in the application context.
The second concluding topic concerns the proper remedy where the
commitment scheme is declared invalid because, as implemented, it falls
outside the state’s civil commitment power and thus has a forbidden pur-
pose. In general, the remedy for a facially invalid statute is to strike down
the statute—by definition, it is not constitutionally enforceable in any
circumstance. Could the court simply order the state to cease operating
145. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267–68 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging
the relevance of state court approvals of ‘‘punitive’’ applications of a statute).
146. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
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with the forbidden purpose? How does the state purge itself, and un-think
the wish to punish?147
Traditionally a daunting dilemma, the problem seems more tractable
in the civil commitment context. There are objective elements that the
state can implement to negate the forbidden purpose.148 For example, the
court could simply order the state to begin complying with the charac-
teristics of a valid civil commitment law, which provide a safe harbor for
purging the improper purpose.149 This is, of course, what the court in
Karsjens did.150
CONCLUS ION
As a system for total deprivation of liberty, civil commitment provides an
escape route from the tight constraints of the charge and conviction par-
adigm. The integrity of those constitutional constraints requires civil com-
mitment boundaries that are judicially patrolled. The Eighth Circuit’s
Karsjens decision eviscerates any accountability for compliance with those
boundaries. The Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence
demands more.
The root of the Eighth Circuit’s mistake is found in its misguided
mapping of substantive due process scrutiny analysis. No doubt, the
Supreme Court has applied a heightened scrutiny in its civil commitment
cases. But standard interest balancing is not the whole, or even the main,
picture. Rather, the Court’s civil commitment cases are more accurately
accounted for by a dual-aspect framing: a focus on the categorical limits of
the civil commitment power and the concomitant search for the forbid-
den purpose of punishment. These constitutional limits arise not from
a generic aversion to arbitrary governmental action, nor directly from the
147. Cf. John Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1214–15 (1970) (arguing that constitutional invalidation on grounds of
improper legislative motivation is problematic in part because it is unclear how a state could
purge itself of the forbidden purpose).
148. See Kagan, supra note 97, at 414, suggesting that courts could ‘‘could construct and
use objective tests to serve as proxies for a direct inquiry into motive.’’
149. See supra Part III.A.5.
150. Karsjens v. Jesson, 2015 WL 6561712 (2015) (First interim relief order), vacated and
remanded sub nom Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
106 (2017).
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fundamental nature of physical liberty. Rather, they spring from the
imperative to protect the integrity of the ‘‘great safeguards’’ of the crim-
inal justice system.
This framework clarifies the facial/as-applied divide. Forbidden purpose
analysis goes hand-in-hand with facial invalidity. Patterns of implementa-
tion are evidence of purpose, and of the authoritative construction of
vaguely worded statutory mandates. Where the bare statutory reference
to the durational principle is thwarted by the complex systems of imple-
mentation, facial invalidity is no less appropriate than if the statute had
demanded lifetime confinement.
The Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence demands
enforceable limits on civil commitment. This article has attempted to
sketch a coherent approach for ascertaining and implementing those limits.
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